Optimal Liability for Terrorism by Lakdawalla, Darius N. & Talley, Eric L.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2006 
Optimal Liability for Terrorism 
Darius N. Lakdawalla 
dlakdawa@sppd.usc.edu 
Eric L. Talley 
Columbia Law School, etalley@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the National Security Law Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Darius N. Lakdawalla & Eric L. Talley, Optimal Liability for Terrorism, NBER WORKING PAPER NO. 12578 
(2006). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1429 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu. 
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









This research was supported by the RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management and Policy.  The
views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2006 by Darius Lakdawalla and Eric Talley. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.
Optimal Liability for Terrorism
Darius Lakdawalla and Eric Talley




This paper analyzes the normative role for civil liability in aligning terrorism precaution incentives,
when the perpetrators of terrorism are unreachable by courts or regulators. We consider the strategic
interaction among targets, subsidiary victims, and terrorists within a sequential, game-theoretic model.
The model reveals that, while an "optimal" liability regime indeed exists, its features appear at odds
with conventional legal templates. For example, it frequently prescribes damages payments from seemingly
unlikely defendants, directing them to seemingly unlikely plaintiffs. The challenge of introducing
such a regime using existing tort law doctrines, therefore, is likely to be prohibitive. Instead, we argue,
efficient precaution incentives may be best provided by alternative policy mechanisms, such as a mutual
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The four years since the September 11 terrorist attacks have wrought monumental changes. In
addition to its staggering human toll, 9/11 effected a profound transformation in America’s prior-
ities concerning national security, civil liberties, and the role of law. The attacks set into motion a
social and political reshuffling as dramatic as any that this country has witnessed in the post-war
era. Much of this upheaval continues to play out today.
Early policy debates after September 11 addressed immediate exigencies, ranging from the
appropriate governmental role in compensating those suffering losses,1 to ensuring homeland se-
curity,2 to the appropriate trade-off between national security and civil liberties.3 While these
concerns remain significant today, a new issue has emerged: the proper role of liability. Approx-
imately 60 individual claimants have opted out of the victims compensation fund (VCF),4 and
are currently pursuing their claims in federal court (Tugend, 2004). Under the Air Transportation
Safety and System Stabilization Act (which also created the VCF itself), any court adjudicating
the cases of opt-outs must apply principles drawn from state common law.5 The historical rarity
of similar terrorist acts in the U.S. has placed significant strains on courts deciding how to extend
existing common law principles to the terrorism context, making the resulting litigation relatively
unpredictable. Despite this unease, a significant amount of terrorism-related litigation is currently
moving through the legal system. As recently as October 2005, for example, a civil jury in New
York found the Port Authority principally liable for deaths and injuries resulting from the 1993
1See, e.g., the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 2322, P.L. 107-297 (Nov. 26, 2002).
2E.g., the U.S. Patriot Act, H. R. 3162 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of Title 18 of the U.S. Code).
3Three recent (and important) Supreme Court cases have centered on this question. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), and Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
4See Virgilio v. City of New York, 407 F.3d 105 (2nd Cir. 2005) (holding that litigation and claims under the VCF
are mutually exclusive, and that any party who makes a claim under the VCF waives all potential civil liability claims,
except possibly against the terrorists themselves).
5See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 408(b)(2), Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230
(2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101). The Act also contained a provision capping exposure of airline defendants in
any civil action to the level of insurance carried by the airlines. Id at § 408(a). Later, similar caps were imposed for
the city of New York, aircraft manufacturers and persons with a proprietary interest in the WTC. See Aviation Security
Act § 201(b), Pub.L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (Nov. 19, 2001).
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truck bomb that detonated in the basement of the World Trade Center.6
Consequently, the policy issues underlying post-terrorism litigation deserve immediate and rea-
soned consideration, particularly because they have so far received little attention in the emerging
literature on terrorism risk. This paper attempts to fill that void, exploring whether and how civil
liability might play an important policy role in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, and in anticipation of
others like them.
At first blush, civil liability seems an odd vehicle for addressing the harms stemming from ter-
rorism, particularly since the agents most directly responsible—terrorists themselves—are usually
beyond the reach of civil and criminal courts. If the law is unable to provide effective incen-
tives for those who cause harm, common sense would suggest civil liability is a poor institutional
choice. Indeed, even though litigation is capable of accomplishing other goals such as spreading
risk, without a meaningful deterrence role litigation is a weak substitute for more direct insurance
mechanisms (which are capable of spreading risk more efficiently).
Closer inspection, however, yields a more complex view of liability’s role. While the threat
of liability often cannot deter terrorists directly, it can shape the incentives of those who experi-
ence harm. For example, the threat of legal liability may induce various types of “targets” (such
as bridges, buildings, public fora, and attractions) to alter their precautions on behalf of licensees,
permittees, and other bystanders likely to be affected when a target is successfully attacked. More-
over, compensation through liability can influence individual “passers-by” in their decisions about
whether to venture out into public fora, where to congregate, and how to protect themselves if
exposed. Finally, the credible threat of liability may affect the strategic interaction among targets
that “compete” to avoid the attention of terrorists. Because terrorism is a central locus for numer-
ous precautionary activities in the face of a collective risk, it is perhaps less surprising that courts
are seriously entertaining the viability of these claims.
In this paper, we ask whether and how civil liability can improve incentives to take precautions
6The case is now proceeding to the damages phase, where the Port Authority will face joint and several liability
exposure. See New York Times, Port Authority Found Negligent in 1993 Bombing, Section A, Page 1, Column 6
(October 27, 2005).
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against terrorism. To frame the discussion, we introduce a formal, game-theoretic model of be-
havior in which terrorists, potential targets, and other collateral victims all take the legal system
as a given and take actions that maximize their own individual expected welfare. (We assume
throughout that terrorists are beyond the reach of the civil courts.7)
Our analysis suggests that, while it is possible to envision a liability system that promotes fully
efficient precautionary incentives, its contours would tend to diverge substantially from existing
doctrinal templates in at least three ways. First, the “flow” of damages payments may differ con-
siderably from what seems plausible under existing tort law: for example, we demonstrate that
under relatively general assumptions, an ‘optimal’ liability regime would not allow bystanders to
recover against a damaged target for their injuries; however, such a regime might well allow the
affected target to recover against affected bystanders. Second, an optimal liability regime would
allow damaged targets and unaffected targets to sue one another, and, under plausible assumptions,
would allow unaffected parties to state a claim for damages against affected targets. Finally, under
an optimal liability regime, it is generically the case that the amount of damages defendants would
pay need not coincide with the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff, and might prescribe damages
even if the plaintiff has suffered no harm.
From a pragmatic perspective, the unconventional forms of liability that our analysis suggests
likely render an efficient civil liability regime an unattractive and politically infeasible approach,
particularly if some alternative mechanism could provide similar incentives. Therefore, we argue
that a more direct and plausible mechanism for efficiency would be a form of social insurance
(not unlike the 9/11 victims’ compensation fund, but without the ability to opt out). Indeed, such
a scheme would more naturally decouple compensation from harm (Choi and Sanchirico, 2002),
and would have the added benefit of spreading risk more efficiently than liability.
7We also assume that the state plays a limited role of establishing the applicable legal doctrines (and potentially
helping to underwrite public insurance). In particular, we do not inquire whether the liability/insurance landscape
affects governmental policy decisions that may affect terrorist activity. See, e.g., Levmore and Logue (2003), who




While the formal analysis appears later, it is worthwhile to explore the intuitive underpinnings of
our argument here. There are three sets of externalities presented by terrorism. Addressing them
all would create an unwieldy and likely infeasible liability regime, but failing to correct them all
leaves inefficient decisionmaking in place.
The first externality is the conventional one that a target (such as the owner of an office building)
may not do enough to protect a collateral victim (such as a passer-by) who might be injured in
the event of an attack. On its own, this motivates the most intuitive form of liability rule, in
which a target owes a duty to compensate a collateral victim. If the building is an efficient harm-
avoider, such a liability rule encourages the building to take due care in ensuring the safety of those
inside and around it. If this were the only incentive problem, the solution would be standard and
straightforward.
However, the strategic behavior of terrorists subverts the effectiveness of this simple liability
rule. Since terrorists’ payoff likely increases in the number of casualties they inflict (see the discus-
sion on page 18), collateral victim patronage increases the risk faced by targets. Patrons, however,
do not account for the way their actions “draw fire” onto targets or each other. The result, even
in the absence of any liability rule, is inefficient over-patronage of targets by victims. Introducing
liability payments from targets to victims generally exacerbates this externality. Therefore, while
there may be corrective justice or insurance rationales for compensating individual passers-by, and
reasons to encourage targets to invest in safety, decoupling these transfers from one another may
well be efficiency-enhancing.
Moreover, strategic terrorists also create incentive problems that involve targets’ interactions
with one another. The simple liability rule posited above does not correct this problem. If terrorists
are strategic maximizers, then the protection decisions of one target can significantly affect the
risk faced by others, even if thousands of miles away. For example, erecting a new building in
a high-risk zone will “draw fire” away from other structures, yielding benefits to their owners.
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Conversely, a decision by an existing target to self-protect by hardening itself may make other
buildings more attractive targets. As a result, targets under threat from terrorism might either
overinvest or underinvest in protection. If liability is to address these incentive problems, it must
afford legal claims between affected targets and unaffected targets.
Given these incentive problems, we find that the optimal liability regime8 has three key features.
First, it forces targets to internalize the losses of individual victims, but optimally redirects all of
those payments to a third-party (in the case of our model, unaffected targets). Redirection avoids
exacerbating the over-patronage problem. Second, it forces victims to pay for the risk they draw
onto targets and each other, but also redirects at least some portion of these payments toward third
parties. Finally, it requires targets to internalize any externality risk they impose upon one another
(and their respective populations of individual victims). The combination of legal actions that
would support the above set of transfers, as noted above, would present significant implementation
difficulties within our current court system.
Our analysis contributes to the literature in a number of ways. Primarily, it builds on a grow-
ing literature concerning terrorism externalities and, more generally, crime externalities. Several
authors have observed that investments in observable crime-prevention or passive avoidance of
crime-ridden areas shifts crime risk onto others (Clotfelter, 1978; Shavell, 1991; Hui-Wen and
Png, 1994; Freeman et al., 1996; Hakim and Rengert, 1981; McNamara, 1994; Newman et al.,
1997). These negative externalities to protection are perhaps even more pronounced in the context
of terrorism (Woo, 2002b; Lakdawalla and Zanjani, 2005).
Complicating this strand of analysis is the existence of important positive externalities. Ayres
and Levitt (1998) have pointed out that unobserved protection against crime may also have positive
spillovers, since others in a close proximity may also benefit from precautionary acts. Similarly,
Kunreuther and Heal (2003) have discussed the case of “interdependent security,” where self-
8By optimal, we implicitly wish to convey something less than first best – in which the terrorist’s activity level
could be directly controlled by the courts/regulatory system. Our benchmark for social optimality, then, is whether
the liability system can implement activity levels by victims and targets that are socially optimal constrained by the
impossibility of regulating terrorist actors.
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protection by one target directly reduces risk for others. For example, effective baggage screening
by one airline lowers risk for all other airlines to which a passenger might connect. In addition,
Keohane and Zeckhauser (2003) have noted that if terrorists prefer to strike densely populated
targets, avoiding such areas has positive externalities. While these and related observations have
also been applied to the study of terrorism insurance (Gron and Sykes, 2002; Lakdawalla and
Zanjani, 2005; Levmore and Logue, 2003) and public policies to deter terrorism (Powell, 2005),
the literature has not specifically considered the appropriate role for liability alongside (or in lieu
of) insurance. We attempt to fill that void here.
Our analysis also contributes to another strand of literature in law and economics, which con-
cerns the difficulty of using liability rules to regulate non-contractible “cooperative” investments
among self-interested parties (e.g., Holmstrom, 1982; Che and Hausch, 1999). In such contexts,
it is frequently impossible for simple liability schemes to induce efficient investments absent some
mechanism that “busts the budget” between the investing parties – i.e., a joint tax in the event of a
loss and/or a joint subsidy in the event of a gain.9 Although a popular theoretical mechanism for
busting the budget in litigation contexts is through “decoupling” (e.g., Polinsky and Che, 1991),
where the defendant’s payment may be larger or smaller than the plaintiff’s recovery, it is often
difficult to implement in practice. Our analysis reveals that complex litigation may function as a
form of “stealth” decoupling without requiring additional apparatus to bust the budget. In settings
involving an overlapping series of multi-sided investments, complex litigation may provide a way
to “decouple” the rents created/destroyed within a particular multi-sided investment, redirecting
them in the form of damages to another party to the litigation (who plays no role in the joint invest-
ment problem at hand, but might in others). In some situations (such as the framework we study),
an optimal system of budget-balanced, strict liability payments exists, even though such a system
would be suboptimal were we to constrain our analysis to a single joint investment problem within
our framework.
9See, e.g., Cooter and Porat (2002) (exploring the notion of “anti-insurance”), or Schwartz and Watson (2001)
(exploring renegotiation costs as a potential source of efficient commitment in contractual settings).
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1.2 Caveats and Preview
There are two caveats to our analysis that deserve explicit mention before proceeding. First,
we abstract from the effects of risk-aversion by considering risk-neutral actors. Although this as-
sumption simplifies our technical analysis considerably, there are other, more substantively central,
reasons for it. If liability is to play a role independent of public and private insurance provision,
it must be by improving the incentives of actors who might otherwise externalize costs and ben-
efits onto others. Risk-aversion would produce an additional insurance “rationale” for a liability
regime, but it would be a spurious one, as this role is best played by an active insurance market.
In our estimation, then, the unique role of legal liability should be to shape incentives, while the
insurance market is the best vehicle for spreading risk.
The second caveat to our analysis is that we assume terrorists to be beyond reach of the courts.
To be sure, there may be some situations where perpetrators of terrorism are subject to civil or
criminal litigation, such as the convictions of Oklahoma City domestic terrorists Timothy McVeigh
and Terry Nichols, or the recovery against the Libyan government for the PanAm bombing over
Lockerbie, Scotland. Although adding this possibility would be relatively simple, we have chosen
not to do it for three reasons. First, it is inconsistent with what most believe to be the most central
and salient characteristic of most (though certainly not all) terrorist acts: the lack of effective
jurisdiction over those most responsible for the harm.10 Second, even if some of the assets of
terrorists were reachable through the tort system, they are likely to be limited relative to the size of
the harm, effectively making terrorists judgment-proof. Finally, even if terrorists’ attachable assets
were significant, there would be little of interest left to study here, since the resulting framework
would lend itself to a more standard economic analyses of tort law (Shavell, 1987).
Our analysis proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we briefly explore the relevant legal issues
10It should be noted that currently, a civil lawsuit brought by survivors of the 9/11 attacks is moving forward
against alleged financiers Osama Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda terror network and Afghanistan’s former Taliban regime.
Those accused include the country of Sudan, three members of the Saudi royal family, various Islamic charities, along
with seven financial institutions and the Bin Laden family’s Saudi construction firm. Even if this suit ultimately
succeeds (on vicarious liability grounds), it is doubtful that in general the financiers of terrorism are well placed to
monitor and deter terrorists themselves.
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surrounding terrorism litigation, and conclude that two sorts of civil liability claims seem at least
plausible (though still highly uncertain) under common law tort templates: Victims (such as by-
standers and owners of nearby structures suffering collateral damage) might sue attacked targets
for inadequate precaution; and attacked targets themselves might sue unaffected targets for “ex-
cessive” precautions. Other types of claims range from exceedingly speculative to absurd, and
therefore would probably be unavailable under existing tort principles. In Section 3, we then
move to characterize the socially efficient liability regime in this environment. We demonstrate
that while there exists a scheme that replicates the social planner’s optimal allocation, it neces-
sitates transfers that are starkly inconsistent with the forms of liability that appeared plausible in
Section 2. We illustrate, nevertheless, that such transfers can be replicated (perhaps more plausi-
bly and efficiently) outside of the judicial system, through public and private insurance schemes.
Section 4 considers various caveats and extensions to our analysis, while Section 5 concludes. (An
Appendix to this article contains the proofs of the various claims).
2 Terrorism and Tort Law
As noted in the introduction, the 9/11 litigation has invited courts to play precedent-setting roles
in determining how to allocate private action recovery rights in the wake of a terrorist act. In
fulfilling this role, courts can be justifiably expected (and are indeed required by statute) to fit
plaintiffs’ claims into conventional tort law doctrines. This institutional constraint should not be
overlooked in our own analysis: For if an otherwise ”optimal” civil liability system contradicted
established doctrinal templates, then it is unlikely to be a serious policy candidate in practice. This
section, therefore, briefly explores exactly when and how pre-existing tort doctrine would likely
constrain the civil liability in practice.
We consider four types of civil litigation: (1) suits brought by harmed individuals (such as
bystanders) against affected targets (such as buildings); (2) suits brought by targets against one
another; (3) suits brought by targets against harmed individuals; and (4) suits brought by unaffected
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targets against affected targets.11 We conclude that (1) is easily justified and (2) may be plausible,
but that (3) and (4) are decidedly poor fits.
2.1 Harmed Individuals Against Attacked Targets
Likely the most standard form of civil liability claim following a terrorist attack would come from
harmed individuals (or their heirs) against the physical targets of terrorist attacks, alleging inad-
equate precaution. In such a claim (as with most tort actions), a successful plaintiff would have
to prove (a) that the defendant owed a duty to undertake reasonable steps to protect the safety and
well-being of victims; (b) that the defendant breached this duty; (c) that this breach actually and
“proximately” caused harm to the victims; and (d) that such harm can be reflected in provable
damages.12
Some of these elements are likely indisputable in the wake of a terrorist act. For example,
the damages suffered by the various victims of the 9/11 attacks have been well-documented: the
Victims Compensation Fund alone has paid out more than $38 billion to victims (Dixon and Stern,
2004). Moreover, assuming it were well-understood how (and whether) terrorists respond to
precautions, one could likely articulate a reasonable standard of care for target-level precautions,
and perhaps even make plausible inferences about whether a failure to undertake them caused the
victims’ injuries.
Plaintiffs might face a less trivial challenge proving that a defendant’s “duty” extended to ex-
traordinary terrorist acts (as opposed to general issues of building safety). Although modern courts
interpret the duty requirement relatively broadly, a number of states have recently begun to con-
strain defendant’s ambit of duty in certain circumstances. For example, a number of courts limit
the application of duty to risks that are not reasonably foreseeable,13 and others have eliminated the
11As noted above, we are excluding claims against terrorists themselves and the government. See supra TAN - .
12The approach is slightly different for products liability claims (such as those filed against Boeing). The differ-
ences, however, are not material for our discussion.
13See, e.g., Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 36 (N.Y.C.A. 1985); Washington v. City of Chicago, 720
NE2d 1030 (Ill. 1999).
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concept of duty from situations involving inherently risky activities by the victim (such as skiing,
attending baseball games, or operating a firearm).14 In principle, such limitations could apply to
terrorism claims as well.
Another potential challenge that individual plaintiffs are likely to face is one of proximate cau-
sation. Unlike “actual” causation (which only inquires whether the defendant’s negligence played
a substantial factor in bringing about the harm), proximate cause limits exposure to situations
where there is a direct and natural connection between the defendant’s action and the resulting
harm. One important proximate cause limitation in conventional tort cases occurs when an un-
likely or exogenous act by a third party intervenes in the causal chain between the defendant’s
actions and the plaintiff’s injury.15 Similarly, in the terrorism context, defendants would likely
contend that an interceding decision by a strategic player (a terrorist or rogue nation) would dis-
able individual victims from recovering from the targets of terrorist acts.16 Although “duty” and
“proximate cause” are conceptual cousins,17 there is a large procedural distinction between them.
The doctrine of duty is one that a judge usually rules on before a case ever reaches a jury (a so-
14See Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055 (2001) (holding that gun manufacturers owe no duty to
victims of gun violence); see generally Esper and Keating (2005).
15In a well-known products liability case, for example, a plaintiff sued an automobile manufacturer to recover on a
manufacturing defect that caused the plaintiff’s spare tire to fall off his SUV while driving on the freeway. Although
initially unharmed, the plaintiff was injured when a third party’s vehicle rear ended the plaintiff’s vehicle while he
was retrieving the tire. The New Jersey Court of Appeals reversed a trial court judgment for the plaintiff, holding that
the intervening act of negligence (both of the victim and of the third party driver) was sufficient to break the chain
of causation begun by the manufacturing defect. Yun v Ford Motor Co., Sup. 276 N.J. Super. 142, 647 A.2d 841
(1994); See also Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 171-5, 484 A.2d 710 (1984) (manufacturer relieved
of liability if superseding intervening cause).
16See, e.g., Port Authority of N.Y. and N.J. v. Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d 305 (3d Cir.1999); Gaines-Tabb v. ICI
Explosives USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613 (10th Cir.1998); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, No.
83-3442, 1985 WL 9447, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17211 (D.D.C.1985).
17Both doctrines frequently focus on unforeseeable occurances in the chain of events leading to a plaintiff’s injury.
Indeed, this spillover is evident in perhaps one of the most well-known cases in American tort law: that of Palsgraff
v. Long Island Railroad 162 NE 99 (1928), where a plaintiff’s injury had been caused by an unlikely chain of events
sparked by the defendant’s negligent actions. Writing for the majority, Justice Cardozo held that the case could not
go forward, since the type of harm suffered was not reasonably foreseeable, and thus there was no duty owed. Writing
in dissent, Judge Andrews viewed the case as one involving proximate causation. To this day, there is not general
agreement about how to classify this case.
It is worth noting that Esper and Keating (2005) criticizes the spillover of the foreseeability doctrine on exactly these
grounds. One potential difference, cited by Judge Hellerstein, is that in the duty context the foreseeability inquiry is a
general one, while in the proximate cause context, it focuses on a specific chain of events that gives rise to a particular
type of injury.
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called “issue of law”). The proximate cause determination, in contrast, is almost always submitted
to a jury to decide (an “issue of fact”). Consequently, prospective plaintiffs would almost certainly
rather litigate foreseeability issues at the proximate cause stage (with the benefit of discovery and
a jury).
Over the longer term, would either the duty or the proximate cause doctrines create a significant
constraint on suits by individual victims against physical targets? Perhaps, but we are skeptical.
Indeed, neither doctrine seems to constitute a categorical barrier against post-terrorism litigation of
this sort. And moreover, the actual individuals making claims such claims (at least thus far) have
been permitted to put forth broad conceptions of duty and probable cause, and lawsuits against the
WTC towers are proceeding apace.18 While the trial court’s broad view of duty and coausation
will survive appeal is not clear, but at the very least American tort law appears to have the flexibility
to allow for such cases (at least in principle).
A similar analysis pertains to “collateral” targets (such as buildings on juxtaposed parcels)
that suffer damage because of their proximity to the primary target. Such cases bear a close
resemblance to the individual-on-target case described above. Indeed, in many respects, collateral
targets are indistinguishable from individual victims who find themselves at the scene of an attack.
Consequently, in our analysis below we will tend to treat suits brought by collateral targets as
equivalent.
2.2 Attacked Targets Against Unaffected Targets
A second conceivable tort cause of action might involve suits by damaged targets against other
undamaged targets, possibly even those thousands of miles away. Unlike the first set of cases, this
form of litigation is more of an ill fit within the modern tort regime. However, there is some limited
support in precedent for liability if the adversely affected target could establish that the unaffected
target’s precautionary acts imposed negative externalities by diverting terrorists to relatively less
18In re Sept. 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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protected targets. In particular, one area of law that allows for such claims is the doctrine pertaining
to liability for harm due to surface runoffs and flooding. Indeed, property owners have long
taken measures to protect their land holdings against flood damage (such as building culverts and
dykes). Such measures, however, are helpful largely because they externalize the risk of flooding
to adjoining properties, somewhat akin to the manner in which hardening of a target throws risk
onto less protected targets.
In the context of surface water runoff, courts have created some limited rights of suit, though
such rights vary tremendously by jurisdiction. Some states adhere to something known as the
“common enemy” doctrine, which shields any landowner from liability from neighboring flood
damage and imposes all the risk on adjoining landowners to either self-protect or reach a com-
mon agreement.19 Another group of states, in contrast, have staked out the opposite side of the
spectrum (something frequently identified as the “civil law” rule)20 imposing strict liability to his
neighbors when his actions to protect his land cause harm to his neighbors.21 Finally, a third set
of jurisdictions have opted for the more moderate course (the “reasonable use” doctrine22), allow-
ing owners to take precautions to protect their land up to the point where their marginal expected
benefit is smaller than the marginal social cost of the protection.23 Although still a minority posi-
tion (embraced in just under ten jurisdictions), it is widely perceived to be growing quickly in its
influence.24
19See, e.g., Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal.2d 396, 50 Cal.Rptr. 273, 412 P.2d 529 (1966); Yonadi v. Homestead Country
Homes, Inc., 35 N.J.Super. 514, 114 A.2d 564 (App.Div.1955), petition denied 42 N.J. Super. 521, 127 A.2d 198
(1956); Butler v. Bruno, 115 R.I. 264, 341 A.2d 735 (1975); Carland v. Aurin, 103 Tenn. 555, 53 S.W. 940 (1899).
20The name emanates, apparently, from the fact that the only civil law jurisdiction in the US, Louisiana, is credited
with being the first state to embrace it. See Orleans Navigation Company v. New Orleans, 1 La. (2 Mart. [O.S.]) 214
(1812).
21These two approaches, sometimes in modified variations, appear to have been adopted in just over twenty states
each each. See Keys v. Romley, supra (counting jurisdictions); and Annot. 93 A.L.R.3d 1193, 1207-11 (1979).
22Though a relatively recent phenomenon nationally, the original seeds of the reasonable use doctrine can be found
in New Hampshire during the 19th century. Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439 (1870); Bassett v. Salisbury Manufacturing
Co., 43 N.H. 569 (1862).
23See Enderson v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163, 32 N.W.2d 286 (1948); Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120
A.2d 4 (1956); Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 236 S.E.2d 787 (1977); Butler v. Bruno, 115 R.I. 264, 341 A.2d
735 (1975); Annot. 93 A.L.R.3d 1193, 1216-21 (1979).
24It is also beginning to infiltrate the other two doctrines, which in some jurisdictions have begun to embrace some
components of fault.
12
Thus, target-on-target liability claims – while probably a long shot – are at least plausible
sorts of claims, particularly in states that have embraced more liberal analogical counterparts in
riparian law. At the same time, however, courts in these states would have to be convinced to draw
these analogies, and plaintiffs would still have to surmount the duty and proximate cause hurdles
discussed above.
2.3 Attacked Target Against Harmed Individuals
A third potential sort of claim involves a suit brought by a damaged target against individuals (such
as bystanders) who were harmed by the terrorist act. Once again counterintuitive, such a claim is
at least conceivable in principle (in light of the discussion above): A large population of individuals
congregating at a target, the argument goes, presents a natural attraction for terrorist attention, if
terrorists care (inter alia) about how many individuals an attack might reach. While individual
victims recognize the fact that their presence at a site marginally increases the odds of a terrorist
act, they do not fully internalize the additional cost that their presence imposes on the target itself
(or on each other), which is also subject to enhanced risk of attack. Consequently, the argument
goes, affected targets argue that the risk of attack was substantially caused (or at least enhanced)
by the presence of victims at the site.
Notwithstanding the conceptual analogy to target-on-target claims, target-on-individual claims
are much less plausible in practice, for a number of reasons. First, in order to proceed against in-
dividuals, it would probably be necessary to file a separate action against each one, a process that
imposes substantial fixed costs on the target plaintiff for each suit filed. The extent of damages that
the plaintiff has suffered as a result of each individual defendant’s actions are likely to be both
speculative and small in magnitude, since any individual victim imposes only incremental risks on
a target. It therefore seems plausible that the cost of filing suit against each bystander victim defen-
dant would greatly exceed the prospective damages that a plaintiff-target might reasonably expect
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in such a suit.25 Second, to the extent that individuals are in a contractual relationship with the
targets (such as employees and lessees at the WTC), the target can use the terms of such relation-
ships to regulate her exposure by limiting the extent to which these contractual counterparties are
present on site.26 Finally, and perhaps most saliently, because of the human element of tragedy that
attends death and injury of individual victims, it would almost certainly be politically unpalatable
for a target-plaintiff to proceed against a population of sympathetic victims, notwithstanding what
optimal deterrence theory may dictate. It is telling that to our knowledge, no such actions have
actually been filed in the 9/11 litigation — yet another more direct indication of the implausibility
of such claims.27
2.4 Unaffected Targets Against Attacked Targets
Finally, and for the sake of completing the permutations at play, one might consider the possibil-
ity that unaffected targets could bring suit against attacked targets. Here, it is difficult to imagine
what tort theory an unaffected target might have at its disposal. Indeed, unaffected target-plaintiffs
would face a seemingly insurmountable burden demonstrating that they suffered any harm what-
soever (either actually or proximately); similarly, such a plaintiff would be unable – virtually by
definition – to prove damages. Add to this the politically unsavory notion of an undamaged target
collecting from a damaged one, and it seems relatively certain that actions such as this will fail.
2.5 Synthesis and Analytic Typology
Our analysis of existing templates in tort law has been necessarily brief, but it does generate a
general framework for thinking about the likely tort claims that harmed individuals and targets
25These problems become even more intractable under a negligence standard. Indeed, because numerous victims
are likely to act independently of one another in an uncoordinated fashion, it would be difficult to determine which sub-
population of defendants was responsible for violating the negligence standard – i.e., that point at which the marginal
social cost of an additional victim at a site exceeds the marginal social benefit. See section , infra.
26This argument, obviously, does not apply to bystanders, passers-by, and others not in contractual privity with the
target – a distinction we revisit below.
27Although not discussed in the text, it also seems quite implausible (and self-defeating) for harmed individuals to
make claims against one another for overpopulating a site.
14
are likely to encounter after a terrorist act. First, for most courts wading into this terrain, it is
overwhelmingly likely that the terrorist actors themselves cannot be made to answer for their own
activities, limiting the court’s response to a type of “second-best” allocation of rights among the
terrorists’ victims and targets (actual or potential). Second, suits by harmed individuals against
affected targets appear to be the most viable jurisprudentially, but they are likely to face stiff
challenges on both duty and proximate cause grounds. Third, suits by damaged targets against un-
affected targets for alleged excessive precautions are unorthodox, but find at least some plausible
analogical templates within existing case law. Here too, though, duty and proximate cause argu-
ments may present significant obstacles, depending on jurisdiction. Fourth, it appears extremely
unlikely (for both practical and economic reasons) that damaged targets can sue individual victims
for “overpopulating” the site and drawing terrorists’ fire. And finally, it seems wholly implausible
that unaffected targets could bring successful claims against attacked targets.
How, then, are courts likely to resolve the uncertainty regarding duty and causation? Based on
a doctrinal analysis alone, it is difficult to make predictions with absolute certainty. However, the
doctrines discussed above are thought to rest heavily on policy considerations about the nature and
effects of liability. And, one important set of policy considerations concerns how liability affects
individual incentives, and in turn allows policymakers to navigate a large set of trade-offs between
social costs and social benefits implicit in acts of terrorism precautions. In the section that follows,
then, we posit and analyze a formal model of behavior that makes these costs and benefits explicit.
Before proceeding, however, we pause briefly to consider the role of contractual relations
among the potential parties. As noted above, at least some individuals harmed by a terrorist
attack are likely to be in a contractual relationship with the target. In such situations, at least
where the contractual vehicle functions well, the terms of their contract may be able to deal with
at least some of the collective action problems between the aforementioned parties. Entry fees,
rental/lease terms, capacity restrictions, conditions of occupancy, office management, and other
contractual mechanisms allow the parties to affect – either directly or indirectly – a large set of
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precautionary activities at a given target without the aid of tort law. In contrast, other parties,
such as bystanders, are not in a contractual relationship with targets (or one another), and tort law
is likely to be a more effective vehicle for completing the market. In addition, there may yet be
other parties (such as subway or food court patrons), who are in a limited contractual relationship,
which may not be sufficiently rich to allocate terrorism risk reliably.
In what follows, then, we will tend to distinguish between (1) individuals who are in either no
contractual privity with targets or a relatively monolithic one, from (2) individuals who have a rela-
tively nuanced contractual relationship with targets. To the extent that the latter group specifically
contracts with terrorism risk in mind, courts may wish simply to effectuate those risk allocations.
We therefore treat this latter group in what follows as roughly coterminous with the “target” in the
analysis that follows, concentrating principally on the former group, who we label as individual
“victims.”28
3 An Incentive-Based Model of Terrorism, Precautions, and
Liability
As noted in the previous section, an important goal of liability policy is to provide individuals with
efficient incentives in a “second-best” world where the perpetrators of terrorism are beyond courts’
jurisdiction. While pure incentive problems are not the only policy goals — problems of efficient
risk-bearing and the provision of public goods like national security are also significant factors —
incentive-provision is both important in the overall policy landscape and uniquely amenable to a
liability solution. In this section, we explore the incentive problems created by terrorism and how
a liability system could solve them.
Our analysis considers a number of different types of actors: Actual or potential targets hit by
a terrorist attack; collateral targets (such as adjacent buildings) that are not targeted themselves but
28Notably, to the extent that targets and their contracting parties do not account for the welfare of bystanders or
other targets, courts may still wish to impose liability on them as a collective unit.
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suffer significant damage from their proximity to the affected target; individual victims (such as
vendors or employees) who are in contractual privity with targets; and victim by-passers who are
not in contractual privity with targets. To simplify, we group with “Targets” all agents in con-
tractual privity with the primary targets of terrorism, under the assumption that they will allocate
their joint risks efficiently amongst themselves.29 We also group collateral targets with bystanders,
since their legal claims would be similar (see above), and since neither is likely to be in contractual
privity with the targets. We will refer to these groups generically as “Victims.”30
As already noted, a key assumption is the impossibility of reaching the terrorists themselves.
Also, and as already noted, we exclude as impractical any suits brought against an individual victim
for his/her incremental contribution to the likelihood of an attack. With these caveats in mind, our
formal analysis proceeds in three stages. First, we develop an economic environment in which
terrorists, targets, and victims interact with one another. Second, we characterize equilibrium
behavior within this framework in the absence of liability and describe its welfare effects. And
finally, we ask whether a prudently designed liability system could improve upon this equilibrium
in welfare terms. In order to focus solely on incentives (rather than insurance), we assume that all
players in our model are risk-neutral.
3.1 Framework
Consider a single terrorist group contemplating whether to attack one or more of N particular
targets. The targets are assumed to be evenly spaced along a circle of (normalized) circumfer-
29This group includes owners of buildings, landmarks, shopping centers, government offices, well-known business,
and the like, that might be the locus of a terrorist’s targeting activities. It may also (depending on the nuance of their
contractual relationship) include lessees, employees, and the like. As noted in the text, there is perhaps less to be
gained by tort claims when complete contracts can be written by rational, welfare-maximizing agents.
30This definition abuses terminology somewhat, since all affected individuals/groups/entities can be appropriately
thought of as ‘victims’; we have used a narrower definition here to distinguish between primary victims (“Targets”)
and secondary victims (our use of “Victims” stated in the text). The key distinction is that targets can directly control
the level of protection against terrorism, while victims cannot, save for relocating themselves away from high-risk
areas. Consistent with the discussion in note 29, victims are assumed unable to write complete ex ante contracts with
targets.
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.31 Successful attacks depend on planning and
preparation. To that end, terrorists invest in preparation against each target i, denoted as ri, where
i = 1, 2, ..., N. The terrorist group has total resources R to allocate among attacking targets, as
well as a non-violent activity (e.g., political rallies, bake sales, etc.) that yields an expected payoff
of Γ(A), where Γ is twice differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave. Terrorists allocate their
resources to maximize their expected utility, defined below.
In the event of a successful violent attack, a potential target is assumed to suffer a loss L,
assumed (for simplicity) to be identical across targets. In addition, however, each target i may
also have vi victims present on site. From the attack, the terrorist group gains utility of B(L, vi)
for each target i that is successfully attacked, where B (.) is assumed to be increasing in both its
arguments.
The assumption that terrorists value casualties can easily be reversed or relaxed, with pre-
dictable consequences for our analysis. However, assuming terrorists to prefer casualties is both
plausible and important in generating incentives that are difficult for courts to align. Even be-
fore September 11, terrorism experts observed modern religious terrorists’ lack of compunction at
mass murder, and tendency to much more extreme forms of violence than terrorists of earlier times
(Hoffman, 1998). This tendency has been reinforced by the hardening of government assets at
home and abroad, which has caused terrorists to turn their attention to “softer” targets where they
can inflict mass casualties (Woo, 2002a). The nature of modern extremist groups, coupled with
the decreased relative cost of hitting densely populated civilian targets, has resulted in terrorism
that seeks mass casualties as a means of gaining publicity and producing shock (Simpson, 2004).
Finally, it is worth noting the lack of evidence that modern terrorist groups take steps to minimize
casualties. Terrorists target crowded public areas like bazaars, public transit, and the like.32
Targets can reduce their probability of loss by investing in self-protection, but their decision
problem is influenced by the behavior of terrorists and victims. In particular, the probability of
31This distribution is not relevant to the terrorists, but is to the victims, as we describe below.
32The only major exception to this pattern is the case of ethnic terrorists, who seek solidarity with their fellow
ethnic group and thus may avoid inflicting casualties on them (Hoffman, 1998).
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a successful attack against target i is a function of terrorist preparation ri and target protection
si, as in ρ(si, ri), where we make the intuitive assumptions that ρs < 0, ρr > 0, ρss > 0 and
ρrr < 0. We also assume that self-protection measures thwart the marginal effectiveness of terror
investments, so that ρrs < 0. Against a “harder” target, terrorists have to spend more resources to
increase their probability of success by a given amount. Victim behavior influences the incentives
of terrorists to attack a particular target. Given the anticipated decisions of victims and terrorists,
targets minimize the expected sum of protection costs, uncompensated losses, and damages (if
any) that must be paid to victims and/or other potential targets.
Finally, “victims” also suffer in the event of an attack if they find themselves near (or inside) an
affected target. In contrast to targets, however, victims have no control over the on-site protection
decisions of targets. The only way victims can protect themselves is to locate in safer areas. Vic-
tims’ initial locations are assumed to be distributed uniformly around the unit circle, and indexed
by k ∈ (0, 1]. They can choose to “stay at home” or patronize one of the N targets. They derive
utility G0 > 0 from their outside option of staying home. The spatiality of the model reflects the
fact that victims might have heterogeneous preferences across location, even holding terrorism risk




∣∣ , and to bear travel costs of γ (
∣∣k − i
N
∣∣). We assume that γ (0) = 0, γ′ > 0, and
γ′′ > 0. Consequently, γ is invertible, and we therefore define the function θ (y) to denote γ−1 (y)
.33 Subsidiary victims maximize the net payoff from their patronage decision, taking account of
both travel costs and uncompensated injury from possible terrorist attacks (described in more detail
below).34
Figure 1 below captures the sequence of the game. Because target decisions are most likely






the victims who are furthest away from any target will simply choose to stay home, even in the absence of terrorist
risk. Relaxing this assumption, we conjecture, has little effect on our results.
34Our framework implicitly assumes that victims capture all the gross surplus (G) from their decision to patronize
a target. This assumption seems natural, since the lack of a contractual relationship makes it difficult for the target to
extract any of the victim’s surplus. Nevertheless, all of our results would follow if we assumed that the target captured
some portion of the victims’ surplus (so long as the patronizing victims as a whole retained some complementary
portion of it).
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to be durable (e.g., building a skyscraper), we assume that primary targets move first, and that
they each install their self-protection level si upon moving. After observing target self-protection,
victims move second, setting aggregate patronage levels, vi, for each target. After observing both
self-protection measures and patronage at each target, terrorists move last. We assume that the
actions taken by each actor are observable to all involved. Note that this description fully defines a
sequential game under complete information.
3.2 Equilibrium and Welfare in the Absence of Liability
To analyze equilibrium behavior in this game, we begin by characterizing predicted play in the
benchmark case where no party can seek compensation through the tort system. This reveals the
externalities that an optimal liability regime must address, but it is also a plausible outcome in its
own right, as pending terrorism litigation may ultimately prove unsuccessful. To characterize the
equilibria of the game, we employ standard backward induction techniques, beginning with the
terrorists, then moving to the secondary victims, and then finally moving to primary targets.
3.2.1 Terrorists
Terrorists observe ~s = {s1, ..., sN} and ~v = {v1, ..., vN} , and allocate their own resources ~r =












Given the concavity of ρ in ri, for any given {~s,~v} the first order conditions of this problem are
both necessary and sufficient for a unique maximum, and are as follows:




















































Figure 1: Sequence of moves.
The interpretation of these conditions is fairly standard. The terrorists allocate resources so that
the expected marginal productivity of investments is equal across all targets and the non-violent ac-
tivity. Thus, for example, when one target increases its own protection, it becomes marginally less
attractive to terrorists. This shock to their rates of return then induces terrorists to shift resources
toward their other alternatives: attacking different targets and investing more in the nonviolent ac-
tivity. Similarly, if a specific target is patronized by more victims, then that target becomes more
attractive to the terrorist group, causing it to shift resources marginally away from other targets and
the nonviolent activity, and toward the more-patronized target.
Formally, these intuitions can be summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Under an optimal allocation of resources by the terrorist group, and for a given
{~s,~v} , ri is uniquely defined, strictly decreasing in si and v−i, and strictly increasing in s−i and
vi. Moreover, for all j, A is strictly increasing in sj and strictly decreasing in vj.
The uniqueness follows directly from the global concavity of the terrorists’ decision problem,
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conditional on victim and target decisionmaking. The effect of the underlying parameters on ter-
rorist behavior is proven in Lakdawalla and Zanjani (2004).35 Perhaps the most important aspect
of Lemma 3.1 is the fact that the resource allocation for a given location i can turn, in part, on
actions taken by victims and targets at different locations (−i). For example, enhanced protection
efforts by a remote target (s−i) can shift risk toward target i as the terrorist group removes marginal
resources from the better-protected target and reallocates them to others. Similarly, greater patron-
age at a remote target (v−i) can shift risk away from target i as the increased patronage makes the
remote target more attractive, and the terrorist group attempts to increase its resource expenditures
there.
In what follows, we shall refer to these cross-target effects as “risk-shifting,” since activities
at one target tend to shift risk onto (or away from) other targets. In contrast, the changes that
patronage/self-protection have in channelling terrorist efforts into (or away from) nonviolent activ-
ities we will call “deterrence,” because it reduces the total level of investment in violent terrorism
that society must bear. Both target protection and victim precaution have risk-shifting and deter-
rence effects. Target self-protection both enhances deterrence on the margin (a positive externality)
and shifts some marginal risks onto other targets (a negative externality). Similarly, a reduction in
victim patronage contributes to deterrence (a positive externality) and shifts risk onto other targets
(a negative externality).
Analysis of the terrorist’s first order conditions also yields the following result:










Essentially, Lemma 3.2 states that deterrence and risk-shifting are generally always present
simultaneously. Self-protection by a target reduces terrorist activity against that target by more
than the additional activity it diverts to other targets. Thus, while target hardening does shift
risk, it has a net deterrent effect in the aggregate. Similarly, victim patronage transfers risk to
35Lakdawalla and Zanjani (2004) proves the result for si; the result for vi is symmetric.
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other targets, but it also draws resources away from the non-violent activity, and thus erodes net
deterrence in the aggregate.
3.2.2 Subsidiary Victims
Having characterized the unique optimal choice for the terrorist group, we now consider how
subsidiary victims behave in light of the terrorist’s anticipated strategy profile. It is important
to distinguish precisely between victims’ internal costs, and the costs that they externalize onto
targets. The latter externalities would form the basis for an optimal liability scheme, if one is to be
formed.
Recalling the incentives and cost structure faced by each victim, each victim considers what
target (if any) she will visit during the period, an action we denote by h. For each victim at location
k, h (k) = i denotes a decision by that victim to spend time at target i. In addition, victims can
choose to spend time away from all targets (i.e., they “stay home”), an activity we denote by




dk denotes the size of the sub-population patronizing target i, for i ∈ {1, ..., N} .
As noted above, victims receive payoff G from patronizing any target (rather than staying
home), but must also bear travel costs of γ
(∣∣k − i
N
∣∣) , to patronize that location. In addition,
however, all victims suffer personal losses should their patronized target be successfully attacked
(in addition to any loss suffered by the target itself). Each subsidiary victim spending time at that
target suffers a negative shock D to her welfare. The expected payoff to victim k from patronizing







− ρ (si, ri) D (3.3)
while the net payoff for the outside (safe) activity remains constant at G0. Note, however, that
victims do not account for the losses of targets, even though they may be partly responsible for the
risk that targets face.
Assuming that all targets have a positive number of victims (which will be confirmed in equi-
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librium), the identity of the “marginal” victim, k∗, who is indifferent between patronage at target i







+ ρ (si, ri(v1, ..., vN)) D, i = 1, ..., N (3.4)
This expression implies that victims located within the radius θ (G−G0 − ρ (si, ri(v1, ..., vN)) D)
of target i will patronize it. Note that the right-hand side of the above expression is strictly increas-
ing in k∗, so the interval [−k∗, k∗] is uniquely defined. Aggregate patronage of each target i is
then given by37:
vi = 2θ (G−G0 − ρ (si, ri(−→s ,−→v )) D) (3.5)
All else equal, victims will tend to move toward more protected targets and avoid less protected
ones. Moreover, since an increase in protection by any one target decreases aggregate risk, it will
also increase the aggregate number of victims who patronize at-risk targets. Formally, we have:
Lemma 3.3. Under an optimal allocation of resources by the terrorist group and optimal choices
by victims, and for a fixed {~s} , the patronage of any target i, vi, is uniquely defined, strictly





The results of Lemma 3.3 are analogous to the argument made by Lemma 3.2. An aggregate
reduction in risk increases the aggregate number of victims choosing to venture out to targets.
This reaction is likely to have a significant effect on target activities. While, as demonstrated
above, self-protection can shift risk onto other targets, these gains come at the cost of drawing in
additional subsidiary victims, who are attracted by the enhanced fortifications. On the margin,
36The reader will note that this set of first order conditions leaves out the constraint that
∑N
i=1 vi ≤ 1. This
constraint will tend not to be binding so long as victims find it optimal to spend at least some time in the outside
activity. We will constrain our analysis to parametric contexts where this condition is satisfied in what follows.
37And consequently, the total number of potential victims who pursue the safe option is:
v0 = 1− Σ · vi = 1−
N∑
i=1
2 · θ (G−G0 − ρ (si, ri(−→s ,−→v )) D)
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then, targets must weigh the private benefits they receive by shifting risks and effecting deterrence,
against attracting more victims (and thwarting their own precautions) on the other.
3.2.3 Targets
We now step back to the initial stage of the game, in which primary targets have the opportunity to
make self-protection decisions. Recall that in the event of a successful attack, target i suffers losses
L, but may invest resources si to dampen the probability of a successful attack. Like the other
parties, primary targets behave strategically, and understand the nature of the subsequent structure
of the game analyzed above: i.e., once targets’ investments are sunk and observed, victims will
then optimize across locational choices, and then the terrorists will optimize across investments in
attacking targets and carrying out nonviolent political activity.




ρ(ri(si, s−i), si) · L + si (3.6)
This problem has the first order condition for each target i :
ρs (ri, si) · L︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct Effect









The intuition behind this condition is relatively straightforward. On the one hand, increasing si
imposes a direct marginal cost of 1 on the target, reflected in the final term on the left hand side of
(3.7). On the other hand, by enhancing self-protection, the target is able to affect the probability of
an attack in both direct and indirect ways. A larger value of si directly reduces the probability of
an attack by acting on the ρ (.) function, represented by the first term on the left hand side of (3.7).
In addition, however, a larger value of si has indirect effects by altering the strategies of victims
and terrorists, and changing the equilibrium value of ri in the continuation game, represented by
the second term on the left hand side of (3.7) .
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Note that the direct effect depicted in (3.7) is strictly negative, and thus there are always direct
benefits to investing in precautions. However, the indirect effect is somewhat more complicated to
sign, since the equilibrium partial derivative dri
dsi
has multiple, countervailing effects. The decom-





















Equation (3.8) represents the equilibrium impact of target 1’s own protection on its own risk. In
general, the sign of this term is ambiguous: For, on the margin, a target’s own protection may not
make it safer, because it may draw in enough victims to offset the effect of protection. In any
interior equilibrium, however, the marginal impact of self-protection on terror investments must be
negative, or targets would not expend valuable resources on it. The external effects of protection
on other targets though remain ambiguous in equilibrium.
By placing on ρ sufficient technical regularity conditions,38 one can show that, dri
dsi
< 0 for
all values of si, limsi→∞
dri
dsi
= 0; and limsi→∞
dri
dsi
= −∞. However, these conditions are merely
sufficient for the optimal choice to be finite and strictly positive. They do not guarantee the global
concavity of the target’s problem. To guarantee concavity (and a unique local optimum), it is
necessary to make one additional assumption:
Assumption A1: The following condition holds everywhere:
ρss (ri, si) + [2ρrs (ri, si) + ρrr (ri, si)] ·
dri
dsi




Condition (A1) is merely the second order condition for global concavity. It is possible to
weaken this assumption, at the expense of complicating the analysis somewhat. In particular,
violation of (A1) implies that there may be multiple local minima from which to choose, and
38The derivation is available from the authors.
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it may be possible that the optimal protection choice might “jump” from one local minimum to
another with a perturbation in the economic environment. Assumption A prevents such jumps
from occurring.
3.2.4 Equilibrium
By construction, we have shown that for a given ~s, the optimal strategies of the subsidiary victims
and targets are uniquely defined. Moreover, we have demonstrated that the optimal si for each
target is almost always unique. We now show that, under the conditions described earlier, there is
only one symmetric equilibrium, according to the following:
Proposition 3.4. If Assumption A1 holds, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium of the no liability
game, which is characterized by (3.7), (3.5), and (3.2).
The symmetry comes from the even spacing of targets and victims, the equal value of each
target, and the symmetric position of the targets in choosing their strategies simultaneously. Let the





In what follows, we constrain our attention in all cases to this family of symmetric equilibria.
Intuitively, we can make a few general predictions about the efficiency characteristics of the
symmetric equilibrium. First, in the absence of any liability regime, there are likely to be too
many victims at each target, since each victim does not internalize the cost of the risk she imposes
on targets. Second, targets are likely to misallocate self-protection resources, since they do not
account for external effects on other targets, and they do not fully internalize the welfare of on-site
subsidiary victims. Hence, targets may expend too much or too little on protection (depending on
which of these effects dominates).39
Efficiency within our model most naturally reduces to maximizing the summed total expected
payoffs of victims and targets (net of loss), conditional on the incentive compatibility constraints
39These intuitions will be important for our later analysis, since they suggest that the optimal liability regime
involves forcing net payments by victims to the population of targets, and payments among targets that depend on
the net externalities associated with protection.
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of the terrorists.40 To simplify the notation, note that the number of victims at target i satisfies
vi
2
= k∗i − 1N , and thus target i is populated by victims over the interval [−vi2 , vi2 ]. Therefore, total
surplus of all victims in the neighborhood of target i (whether they patronize or not) consists of the
sum of each victim’s individual surplus:









(G−G0 − γ (x)− ρ (si, ri) D) dx (3.9)




(ρ(si, ri)L + si) (3.10)
A ‘socially optimal’ allocation of resources, then, would maximize the social surplus of victims










(G−G0 − γ(x)− ρ(si, ri)D) dx− (ρ(si, ri)L + si)
]
(3.11)
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint:
Γ′(A) = ρr(si, ri)B(L, vi) (3.12)
Constraining our analysis to a symmetric equilibrium, this problem simplifies to one of choos-
ing {v̂, ŝ, r̂} to maximize surplus for a representative target, so that the social welfare function
becomes,




(G−G0 − γ(x)− ρ(ŝ, r̂)D) dx− ρ(ŝ, r̂)L− ŝ (3.13)
40Note that this formulation does not include the welfare of terrorists, which seems most natural in this context. It
also does not include any other social benefits of reducing terrorist behavior that are not visited on prospective victims
or targets. We explore the relaxation of this definition below.
41Recall that our definition of social optimality takes terrorists’ actions / reactions a constraint (as they are assumed
outside the regulatory structure). Thus, in reality, this is a type of constrained second best. Observe also that we are
implicitly according equal weight to the welfare of targets and victims.
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and the social planner’s problem reduces to,
max
v̂,ŝ
Ψ (r̂, ŝ, v̂) (3.14)
subject to
Γ′(A) = ρr(ŝ, r̂)B(L, v̂)
One way to conceive of the terrorist’s incentive compatibility constraint is in reduced form, so
that the planner chooses both ŝ and v̂ knowing that terrorists will react optimally, according to the





















































The efficient protection decision accounts for the impact of protection on total social losses
(v̂D + L), which includes both victim and target losses. The efficient allocation of victims in
(3.16) results in strictly positive surplus for the marginal victim. Comparing (3.16) to the anal-
ogous condition (3.5) characterizing private decisionmaking in a symmetric equilibrium, we see
immediately that the socially optimal level of victim patronage is strictly less than the privately op-
timal level. Indeed, when the marginal victim makes her patronage decision, she does not consider
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the effect her presence has on the risks of others. Analysis of the problem leads to the following





The efficiency properties of self-protection decisions by targets, on the other hand, are more
complex. Protection may be inefficiently high or low, because it involves both positive externalities
for potential victims, but negative externalities on other targets. Since the private marginal benefit






L, the key comparison comes down to whether the social marginal
benefit (which equals unity) is less than the private marginal benefit evaluated at the social opti-
mum. If social benefit is less than private benefit, targets are engaging in too much protection.











On the other hand, should this strict inequality hold in the opposite direction, the targets engage in
too little protection. Simplifying this condition, we have the following:
Proposition 3.5. Absent a liability regime, and if assumption A1 holds, victims always over-
patronize targets relative to the social optimum, so that vNL > v̂. Targets, on the other hand,
may overprotect or underprotect, and in particular they over-protect (sNL > ŝ) if and only if, at











The condition in the above proposition can be equivalently characterized as: the external
marginal benefits of protection in equation 3.15 are negative.
3.3 Liability, Behavior, and Welfare
We now explore the equilibrium with liability rules. In order to consider the effects of liability,
suppose that target i has been successfully attacked, and has suffered damages L. Moreover, the
vi victims at the target have also suffered damages D each. We now consider each of a family
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of compensation schemes. In each case, all targets but the attacked target must make a transfer
payment to target i in the amount of τ−i (si, s−i). Target i, in turn, is required to make a transfer
payment θi (si, vi) to the injured victims. (We do not consider systems under which targets bear
liability for other targets’ victims, because these are subsumed by the system we consider).42
Perhaps the simplest form of liability to consider is a form of strict liability – transfer payments
that are mandatory upon proof of harm. We will consider a family of liability functions, in which
each target bears some responsibility for liability of an attacked target, and each target bears some
responsibility for damages incurred by its own victims. Thus, unaffected targets’ liability to an
affected target i would be given by:
τ−i (s−i, si) = αL (3.19)
where the policy parameter α captures the fraction of a target’s loss compensated by other targets.
Under this formulation, the total amount received by i is therefore:
∑
j 6=i
τ−i = (N − 1) αL (3.20)
The liability of the attacked target to its own subsidiary victims is:
θi (si, vi) = βDvi (3.21)
where the policy parameter β represents the fraction of an individual’s damages compensated by
the target. Note that both of these parameters can be either positive or negative, at least in theory
(though, as noted above, there may be practical limitations on expecting that β would ever take on
negative values – a possibility we address below).
The introduction of liability rules such as those above obviously distorts both targets’ and
42A payment from target B to the victims at target A can be effected by a transfer from target B to target A, coupled
with one from target A to its victims.
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victims’ choices. In the presence of these transfers, and in the case of 2 targets, the representative





ρ(ri, si) · ((1− (N − 1) α) L + βviD) +
∑
j 6=i
ρ (rj, sj) αL + si
]
(3.22)

















αL− 1 = 0
(3.23)
Similarly, with victims, the market-clearing conditions also change to reflect the damage pay-











− ρ (si, ri) D = −ρ (si, ri) Dβ
The terrorist’s structural conditions for maximization remain unchanged, as terrorists are assumed
to be beyond the reach of the tort system.




Ψ (r̂, ŝ, v̂) (3.25)







L− 1 = 0
which coincides with the no-liability FOC derived above.
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subject to
Γ′(A) = ρr(ŝ, r̂)B(L, v̂)
Equation (3.23)
Equation (3.24)
Analysis of this problem yields the following proposition:
Proposition 3.6. If the policy choice of α and β is unconstrained, and if (A1) holds, then the opti-
mal strict liability regime (α∗, β∗) is unique and implements the constrained second-best allocation









































Moreover, under this regime, β∗ < 0, and thus targets always would have potential cause of action
against their subsidiary victims, but not vice versa. The net transfer of resources from unaffected
targets to affected targets is ambiguous in sign, but increases with the extent of risk-shifting: that





Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the above proposition is its implications for victims.
Indeed, the socially optimal liability rules require that victims reimburse affected targets in the
event of an attack, and not vice-versa. This counter-intuitive result is due to the negative externality
victims impose on targets: as noted above victims tend to free-ride off the protection investments
of targets, failing to account for the enhanced risk their patronage places on other victims and the
target itself.
As noted in Section 2, however, it is difficult to believe that allowing a cause of action against
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subsidiary victims is a viable policy choice for regulators. Indeed, not only will those defendants
be more likely to be judgment-proof, but they will have also suffered significant injuries (or death)
themselves, a fact that makes it difficult (perhaps prohibitively so) for a cause of action against
victims to be politically palatable. To account for this tension, we introduce one more constraint
on the regulator’s problem, in which she is confined to choosing only nonnegative values for β.
Adding this constraint to the regulator’s problem immediately yields the following proposition:
Proposition 3.7. If the policy choice of α and β is constrained so that β ≥ 0, then the optimal
strict liability regime (α∗c , β
∗
c) does not implement the constrained second-best social planner’s
optimum, but instead implements {rc, sc, vc} , where vc > v̂ and rc > r̂. Here, the optimal liability































Under this regime, targets neither have a cause of action against their subsidiary victims, nor do
victims have a cause of action against targets. The net transfer of resources from unaffected targets















Note that the constraints above might be too generous, relative to existing legal templates. Since
transfers from a harmed target to unharmed targets seem legally infeasible, it may be appropriate
to impose the additional constraint that α ≥ 0. Under this added constraint, if the optimal α from
Proposition 3.7 were negative, the best feasible liability structure would be no liability rules at all
(α = β = 0).
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The next subsection discusses some of the core intuitions behind the above two propositions.
3.4 Intuition Behind Results
The optimal liability regime is built to solve three basic problems, each of which contributes to the
form of the optimal transfer payments described above. The easiest way to understand the results
in toto is to isolate each of three market failures: (1) Failure of targets to account for the interests
of victims; (2) External effects of targets on other targets; and (3) External effects of victims on
targets and other victims. Below we show how each of these factors is captured in the above results.
We concentrate on the two target case for expositional reasons (though the results carry forward to
the N target case).
3.4.1 Accounting for Victims
The first and most conventional source of market failure is the inability of targets to account for the
interests of their subsidiary victims, absent a liability regime. To focus attention on this problem,
we will suppose that there are no external effects of target behavior, dr2
ds1
= 0, and that victim
behavior has no external effects on targets, dr
dv
= 0.
In this case, the optimal liability transfers reduce to:
αL = −vD (3.26)
β = 0 (3.27)
In the event of an attack, the target of interest pays the unaffected target the value of victim
losses, but no other transfers are made. Victim behavior has no external effects on targets, and
target behavior has no effects on other targets. The only inefficient margin of decisionmaking is
the target’s private return to protection, which excludes the expected losses of victims from an
attack and thus fails to match the social return to protection. To correct this problem, the optimal
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liability rule requires that the target pay for victim losses.
Note, however, that this payment does not go to victims. In this environment, victim decision-
making is exactly efficient: victims do not shift external risk onto targets. Transfers to victims
would only be distortionary. Moreover, note that the payment being made to the unaffected target
is largely incidental. We could just as easily have required that the target pay the government a
fine equal to victim losses. In this particular case, the money received by the unaffected target has
no impact on its incentives, because the unaffected target cannot manipulate the risk of attack. In
this case, the unaffected target functions as nothing more than a repository for the payment made
by the damaged target. Therefore, this liability rule can be equivalently implemented as a fine paid
by the affected target, where the fine is set equal to the value of victim losses. This reinforces the
importance of decoupling liability for victim losses from payments to victims.
3.4.2 External Effects Among Targets
We now consider external effects among targets, or the possibility that dr2
ds1
6= 0. Without loss of
generality, consider the case of target substitution, where dr2
ds1
> 0, so that protection expenditures



















− (ρs + ρr dr1ds1 )
β = 0
Since victim behavior involves no external effects, there continues to be no reason to transfer
resources to or from victims. However, the fine paid by the affected target is now partially offset
by a transfer from the unaffected target. The logic here is that the behavior of the other targets
contributed in part to the losses experienced by victims. As a result, the bill for victims’ losses is
borne jointly. Similarly, there is also a transfer from the unaffected target to the affected one, to
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compensate it for its own losses caused by risk-shifting. This transfer is a fraction of the target’s
own losses, and represents the way in which these losses are also borne jointly.
This type of arrangement might be difficult to implement through the courts, because judges
might be reluctant to hold a target liable for being too secure. However, a mutual insurance pool
presents us with a feasible way of implementing this policy. The pool can be designed to exploit
the fact that the transfer from one target to another is always less than vD + L.
To take the simplest structure—one that lacks any insurance features—suppose that all potential
targets of terrorism contribute vD + L, total damages in the event of an attack, to a pool. If an
attack does not take place, their money is refunded. If an attack does take place, the affected target
receives back the amount vD + (1 + α)L > 0; this results in a net transfer to the affected target
of size αL. The pool will necessarily have enough funds on hand to make this transfer, because
αL ≤ vD + L. Remaining funds in the pool are then refunded to the unaffected targets.
If αL > 0, the affected target receives a net transfer, and the pool can also incorporate an
insurance feature. If there are N targets, each can contributes vD+L
N
to the pool. In the event of an
attack, the affected target can then be paid αL, and the remainder can be refunded to the unaffected
targets. If N is large, this approximates the efficient outcome.
3.4.3 Externalities from Victim Behavior
Finally, we analyze the externalities in victim behavior. If terrorists value casualties, so that dr1
dv1
>
0. This results in inefficiency, because victims do not consider the impact of their behavior on the
risk faced by targets.
Adding the victim externalities introduces a transfer from victims to the affected target, to











. This transfer from
victims to targets aligns victims’ private margins with social margins, but it actually introduces
distortion into target decisionmaking. When β = 0, the private returns to protection are exactly
equal to the social returns. Nonzero β eliminates this result. As a result, equation 5.6 incorporates
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a transfer payment that purges the effect of β from the target’s decision problem, by causing targets
to disgorge a component of this payment to other targets (capitalized within the transfer payment
going between affected and unaffected targets).
In other words, payment by victims leads to efficient behavior for them, but channeling this
payment to targets can distort targets’ incentives. A better solution might be to impose payments
or fines—or, more realistically, offer only incomplete insurance to risk-averse victims—on vic-
tims, while at the same time maintaining a mutual pool among targets to correct problems in their
decisionmaking.
4 Caveats and Extensions
Before concluding, we turn briefly to two caveats and/or extensions of our model. First, we con-
sider alternative liability regimes (such as negligence). We then consider the effect of more general
“public good” dimensions of target hardening – i.e., the possibility that more impervious targets
may create a general benefit for society because people feel ‘safer.’
4.1 Alternative Liability Approaches
The discussion above has focused exclusively on relatively simple “strict” liability rules versus no
liability. In many ways, this makes sense, given the fact that these two options are well represented
among states (see Section 2 above). Moreover, so long as the regulator’s choice is unrestricted (i.e.,
β can be either positive or negative), we demonstrated that a strict liability system can replicate the
outcome of the social planner’s problem. However, other possible variations exist – particularly
variations on negligence rules.
Consider first the possibility of a simple negligence regime governing both target liability to
other targets and target liability to victims. Under a target-on-target regime, liability of an un-
affected target to an affected one turns on whether the that targets have exceeded a prescribed
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threshold level of precautions, sN . Only if an unaffected target’s expenditures exceed this level
will liability be found. Thus, with appropriately large sanctions, it is always possible to induce
targets to implement no more than the prescribed level of precaution.
On the other hand, implementing a negligence regime for victims is extremely problematic.
Indeed, as has already been demonstrated, when victims respond to target-hardening by increased
patronage, the case for any liability at all becomes difficult to defend on efficiency grounds. Equiv-
alently, then, the optimal negligence scheme would place the negligence standard at zero, so that
all firms satisfied it.
Nevertheless, one could envision – at least in theory – a negligence regime that was based on
liability of victims to affected targets. Under this view, victims would be liable to an attacked
target whenever their aggregate patronage of the target exceeded some prescribed threshold level.
But such an approach is even less satisfactory on pragmatic grounds than strict liability of victims
to targets. First, just as with strict liability, victims may be liquidity-constrained, and not in a
position even to make damages payments to targets. Second, because each victim contributes
only a portion of the overall congestion in a given target, it is virtually impossible to implement
a negligence rule for victims: indeed, this would require identifying the victim(s) that effectively
“caused” overall patronage to exceed the level that is prescribed by the negligence standard.
Consequently, the optimal negligence rule in our model would look very much like the optimal
strict liability rule: victims would have no cause of action against attacked targets, but attacked
targets would have a potential cause of action against other targets if the degree of risk-shifting
were sufficiently high.44
4.2 Public Goods
In focusing on incentive effects, we did not discuss the role of public goods in protection against
terrorism (see Lakdawalla and Zanjani, 2005). If society is particularly interested in the patron-
44A similar set of arguments would apply to other variations on negligence, such as comparative and contributory
negligence. We therefore omit them in our analysis.
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age of certain landmark buildings or downtown areas, there may be social reasons to compensate
victims in the event of a terrorist attack. Similarly, if there is a public good associated with the
construction of landmark buildings that might be more heavily targeted by terrorists, society may
have incentives to encourage such building by providing additional protection against terrorism.
These types of victim compensation plans can be deployed in conjunction with liability ar-
rangements. Perfectly insuring victims against losses has undesirable incentive effects, but partial
compensation from society to victims may promote the public good while still retaining efficient
incentives to avoid high-profile targets.
Similarly, there may be public goods associated with building in high-profile downtown areas.
This may justify transfers, perhaps in the form of subsidized terrorism insurance, from society
to the targets of terrorism. Such transfers can be incorporated into the mutual insurance pool
described above, by allowing taxpayers to contribute to the pool and thus implicitly underwrite
insurance against terrorist attacks.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has considered the appropriate role of civil liability in the wake of a terrorist act, under
the assumption that terrorists themselves (and those controlling them) are beyond the reach of
courts. We have demonstrated that it is possible in theory to design a liability regime that induces an
efficient allocation of precaution. In practice, however, such a regime required would be extremely
difficult (if not impossible) to implement. In particular, under plausible conditions, the optimal
liability regime involves transfers from victims to affected targets, and possibly even from affected
targets to unaffected targets. Such transfers seem unlikely (and even absurd) under traditional
doctrinal templates within tort law. Moreover, they would offer few (if any) advantages over a
simpler approach involving mutual insurance for targets and direct compensation to victims.
There are a number of relatively simple extensions to our analysis that, we conjecture, would
complicate it but not reverse our findings. Introducing risk-aversion into our model, for example,
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would likely have only minor effects for our incentive story, but might make litigation a more
attractive insurance vehicle. At the same time, of course, introducing risk aversion would also
make insurance an even more attractive insurance vehicle, since it spreads risks more efficiently
across individuals.
Similarly, introducing incomplete information would also likely have ambiguous changes on
our results. Indeed, if agents were widely uninformed or misinformed, liability probably would
have even less of a role to play, since (a) it is not clear what incentives agents will respond to,
and (b) judges are likely to be similarly afflicted by a lack of information, inhibiting their ability
to apply liability rules appropriately. On the other hand, asymmetric information might provide
some grounds for a liability regime that shifts much of the risk onto the party (or parties) with
the best information. A significant difficulty with such an approach in this context, however, is
the task of identifying a well-informed agent. Apart from the government, it is not clear which
agents in society have above average information about the risk of terrorism or the effectiveness of
protective investments.45
There is, however, one crucial distinguishing feature of terrorism that we have not considered
at great length: the “public good” value of national security or prestige. Terrorism policy is made
in the context of a war effort, where terrorists seek to undermine national confidence and security.
Because defeating that goal may constitute a public good, victim compensation may be an appro-
priate and welfare-enhancing way to induce individuals to continue with normal life in the face of
terrorism risk. Moreover, as noted above, if security has a sufficiently large public good value, then
the optimal liability regime may align more coherently with existing tort law templates. But even
so, if one were convinced that the public good value of security were this important, it is difficult to
understand why targets alone should pick up the tab. Direct compensation from the government,
in fact, may still be preferable to liability. Contributing to this conclusion is the government’s own
45Although not explored at length here, relaxing the assumption of symmetric distributions of targets and victims
would be unlikely to change our qualitative conclusions, which emanate exclusively from marginal optimization con-
ditions. Asymmetrically distributed targets, however, might imply the optimality of target-specific liability parameters
(α and β) however, but whose qualitative characteristics would still correspond to the propositions above.
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set of terrorism incentives: although not analyzed above, government actions themselves often in-
fluence terrorism risk, perhaps more than any other private actor we have considered; payments
from the government may sometimes make general sense on pure incentive grounds as well.
Viewed in this light, the September 11 Victims’ Compensation Fund was well-conceived, but
may not have gone far enough to preclude opt-out tort claims. In the end, more research is likely
needed on public goods provision as it relates to terrorism and liability incentives. This paper
hopefully provides a helpful first step.
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Appendix
This appendix derives comparative static results in detail and provides proofs that were omitted
from the text.
A.1 Terrorist Comparative Statics
In the two-target case (the N-target case is virtually identical), the terrorists’ first order conditions
can be written as:
Γ′(A)− ρr(s1, r1)B(L, v1) = 0 (5.1)
Γ′(A)− ρr(s2, r2)B(L, v2) = 0 (5.2)
R− A− r1 − r2 = 0 (5.3)
Assuming a symmetric equilibrium with two targets (i.e., r1 = r2 = re) and differentiating with



















(Γ′′)2 − (Γ′′ + ρrrB)2
> 0
(5.4)





The comparative static relationships between victim choices and terrorist decisions are similar.


















(Γ′′)2 − (Γ′′ + ρrrB)2
< 0
(5.5)
These expressions demonstrate that an increase in protection by any one target increases the






A.2 Victim Comparative Statics
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A.3 Equilibrium for Victims
The victims’ first order conditions are:
γ (v1) + ρ (s1, r1 (v1, v2, s1, s2)) D −∆G = 0
γ (v2) + ρ (s2, r2 (v1, v2, s1, s2)) D −∆G = 0
which have an associated Jacobian:
J =
[
γ′ (v1) + ρr (s1, r1) D · ∂r1∂v1 ρr (s1, r1) D · ∂r1∂v2
ρr (s2, r2) D · ∂r2∂v1 γ′ (v2) + ρr (s2, r2) D · ∂r2∂v2
]
,
which in turn has determinant:
|J | =
(





































. And thus we have:
|J | =
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Now consider how a change in s1 affects equilibrium values of v.The vector of s1 derivatives





















D γ′ (v2) + ρr (s2, r2) D · ∂r2∂v2
]
,
which, when evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium, has determinant:
|J1| =
(−)︷ ︸︸ ︷

































If the square bracketed term is weakly negative, then |J1| < 0. But this is clearly satisfied, since
we know from above that the own partials on ri have higher absoluate value than the cross partials
on ri. Thus, we have:
∂v1
∂s1
= −|J1||J | = −
(γ′ (ve) ρs) + Dρr
(



















ρr (se, re) D · ∂ri∂vj
) > 0
Now consider comparative statics on v2.The substituted Jacobian is:
J2 =
[
γ′ (v1) + ρr (s1, r1) D · ∂r1∂v1 ρs + ρr ∂r1∂s1 D
ρr (s2, r2) D · ∂r2∂v1 ρr ∂r2∂s1 D
]
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The interpretation here is simple: So long as the “crowding” effect on a target is not “too”
large, victims will tend to flock away from targets that have lower relative protection. When
crowding effects are large, on the other hand, hardening a target will induce more victims to enter
the risky activities, so much so that some of them may choose to spend time at the unhardened
target (realizing that, in equilibrium, terrorists will be spending less effort to attack it).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3.5
The proposition follows immediately from the textual analysis, and the proof is therefore omitted.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3.6
The unconstrained liability problem can be solved in two stages. Victim behavior only depends on
β. Target behavior depends on both. So we proceed by fixing β optimally, and fixing α optimally
given β.


















− ρ (si, ri) D = −ρ (si, ri) Dβ
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Evaluating both expressions at the social optimum and substituting allows us to solve for β by





ρ (si, ri) D
Given this value of β, we consider the target’s optimal choice, similarly comparing it to the



























































A.6 Proof of Proposition 3.7
Since the constraint on β must be binding, we know that β = 0. Substituting this value into the
target’s optimality condition, and comparing to the social optimality condition allows us to solve



































and thus the target will be a net recipient if and only if its level of protection was inefficiently high
in the absence of liability. This condition is tantamount to the inequality condition given in the
proposition.
The first expression is straightforward: paying victims in the event of a loss makes them less
averse to such a loss. In the second expression, the effect of target transfers on victims depends
entirely on how these affect target protection. If target transfers increase the level of protection,
they draw more victims in, and vice-versa. QED
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